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# The evidential role of *dizque* in Mexican Spanish: diachronic and synchronic aspects

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¿Es usted mexicano? Sí, pero no lo vuelvo a ser.  
*Los culpables*, Juan Villoro

## Abstract

Evidentiality deals with the source of information entertained by a given speaker in a provided communicative environment. As I understand the term, it is the part of language that aims to give information about the relation that the speaker has with whatever s/he is saying. The present study aims to explore synchronically and diachronically the possibilities of evidentiality in two Spanish related objects: *dizque* and *dice que*. It is certain that historically both find a correlative meaning: ‘s/he says that’, providing, at first sight, the lecture in which information of a given event was acquired indirectly. The grammatical system of a given language L (which descriptively has to correspond to essential questions of any language L) is rearranged when certain changes occur. There are few studies that combine both approaches when dealing with categorization of linguistic particles. If taken to be serious the enterprise of cognition, a fully account of the changeability of language has to be made. This is achieved by knowing the causes of interaction and accommodation of grammar particles. Hence, the consideration of the latter cannot be fully understood without looking ‘backwards’.

This being so, the present work not only analyses different data from different places (books, internet, CORDE, CREA and academic articles are used as main sources for the extirped data), but also, by making a revision of the literature, it approaches an explanation of some of the evolutionary causes that have had impact in encoding evidentiality in the language-type Spanish. Concretely speaking, in §1, I make an introduction to the concept of *evidentiality* by broadly reviewing the history of the term. Since there has been an ongoing debate on whether evidentiality should be a part of modality or not, in §2, I approach the definition and distinction of both concepts. In §3, I make a broad characterization of the two related objects in Spanish *dice que* and *dizque*. In §4, I review the notions made over the concept of grammaticalization and I explain *how* the notion is related to the particle *dizque*. Lastly, in §5, I approach some of the synchronic and regional studies made regarding the uses of *dizque* in different varieties of non-Peninsular Spanish.

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# I. Evidentiality and grammar

## 1. Notion of evidentiality

### 1.1 Definition and characterization

There has been a bunch of attempts to introduce the concept of evidentiality in the linguistic terminological machinery. One of these many attempts has been made by David Crystal in its book *A Dictionary of Linguistics & Phonetics* (1991), where he defines the concept as a: “term used in SEMANTICS for a type of EPISTEMIC MODALITY where propositions are asserted that are open to challenge by the hearer, and thus require justification.”

Regarding *epistemic modality* one is forced to look in other specialized dictionaries, such as the *Diccionario de la lingüística moderna*, where the concept is defined as: “a type of modality that relates with the degree of certainty that the speaker has over the propositional content of a sentence”<sup>1</sup> (p. 355). However, more important to our purposes is Crystal’s definition, from which Infantidou (2001) sees two main problems: “First, [that] he defines evidentiality as a semantic notion [...] Second, [that] according to Crystal, the term ‘evidential’ does not apply to constructions that express possibility or necessity” (p. 1).

Defining evidentiality as part of the SEMANTICS is certainly problematic because it excludes the possibility of analyzing *must*, *may* and *might* as evidential markers. These aspects certainly raise the question not only about the scope of the term ‘evidential’ but also about where the borderline between *evidentiality* and *modality* is to be drawn.

In the modern literature, the conceptual debate concerning the place of evidentiality and epistemic modality in linguistic theory has become one of the hottest *leitmotifs*. Basically, three different relations between both notions can be found. Either authors prefer to distinguish one from the other (disjunction) (De Haan, 1999); or authors aim to fit one of them within the semantic scope of the other (inclusion) (Palmer, 1986); or, finally, authors see them as intersecting concepts (overlapping) (Langacker, 2017). In the latter case, authors tend to acknowledge that evidentiality is too close to epistemic modality to ignore its

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<sup>1</sup> I transcribe the original definition in Spanish: “Se identifica como ‘epistémica’ la MODALIDAD que se relaciona con el mayor o menor grado de probabilidad o certeza que el hablante otorga al contenido proposicional del enunciado.”

relationship. This is, for example, the case of *inferentials*, where evidence is acquired upon reasoning and consequently a ‘modal flavor’ is detected (Van der Auwera and Plungian, 1998:85):

**Context** (pragmatic value):

Fulgencio enfermó. ‘Fulgencio being sick’

(1) **Es que** Fulgencio besó una rana.

‘It is that Fulgencio kissed a frog’

As seen in (1), the translation of the *es que* would be something like “**the reason why** Fulgencio is sick is **because** he kissed a frog”. The inferential property is marked by *es que* and it gives the information of something like “what happened was that because of some event that happened (Fulgencio kissing a frog), Fulgencio became sick”. Or in other words: the hypothetical speaker sees that Fulgencio is sick and communicates the fact by marking his/her reasoning result. In the same line, Langacker (2017) that *inference* is a major cognitive reason for evidentiality and modality to be hardly separated.

However, beyond this *inferential* similitude, it seems plausible to think that there has to be a way of knowing what evidentials are and how do they work in order to distinguish them (formally and functionally) from other grammatical categories. According to Aikhenvald (2004), “unlike most other grammatical categories, information source can be marked more than once in a clause, reflecting the same observer” (p. 4). Furthermore, the functional properties of evidentials also relates two unresolved problems regarding its limits as a grammatical category. First, whether it should be considered to be a cross-linguistic phenomena and therefore categorized as the marking of source of information. Second, whether it should be defined more broadly as denoting ‘attitudes towards knowledge’ and hence including epistemic modality and other perspectives on propositions and states of affairs.



This sort of grammatical labeling has been put forward by Anderson (1986)<sup>2</sup>, who, by examining different sentences in English, arrived at the conclusions that evidentials are characterized by the following properties:

- (1) Evidentials denote the kind of ‘justification’ a speaker has for making a claim, whether that comes from direct evidence or observation, evidence plus inference, inference with unspecified evidence, an expectation from logic, or whether the evidence is visual or auditory, etc.
- (2) Evidentials are not the main predication in a clause; rather, they are added to a factual claim ABOUT SOMETHING ELSE.
- (3) The indication of evidence is the primary meaning of an evidential, not merely a pragmatic evidence.
- (4) Evidentials are morphological inflections, clitics, or other ‘free’ syntactic elements (as opposed to compound or derivational forms)
- (5) Evidentials are normally used in assertions (realis clauses), not in irrealis clauses, nor in presuppositions.
- (6) When the claimed fact is directly observable by both speaker and hearer, *evidentials* are rarely used (or have a special emphatic or surprisal sense).
- (7) When the speaker (first person) was a knowing participant in some event (voluntary agent; conscious experiencer), the knowledge of that event is normally direct and evidentials are often then omitted.

Evidentiality, and its proper markers in a discourse of a given language, is essentially concerned with marking the *how* of an event that a speaker witnessed (i.e. where the information came from), indicating the speakers’ position towards the source of knowledge. Anderson’s characterization becomes useful when trying to abstract the proper features of an evidential marker. Even further, making an analysis on the latter enumeration, there can be seen that, on the one hand, points (1) through (3) rely on the *pragmatics of evidentials*, on the relation that an evidential might have over a given event linguistically decoded; while, on the other hand, points (4) through (7), rely on the *grammar of evidentials* (that is, their structural and functional combinations) by showing *how* they can be expressed (i.e. morphologically or lexically), with what they are usually combined (i.e. assertions) and what is the *nature* of the evidence presented (i.e. directly observable or not).

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<sup>2</sup> Even though this list could become illustrative for whomever approaches evidentials, according to Aikhenvald (2004), some of Andersons’ claims are highly arguable (for the whole characterization of evidential markers see Anderson, 1986; for arguments see footnote on Aikhenvald, 2001: 16)

Historically, the concept of evidentiality has been absent from linguistics textbooks and surveys of grammatical categories, mainly due to a lack of European and classical languages with distinctive evidential forms<sup>3</sup> (Infantidou, 2001). In fact, the interest in evidentiality, as noted by Aikhenvald (2004), started its way when Indo-European grammatical categories were not sufficient to give a full account of linguistic phenomena in ‘exotic’ languages, such as Quechua and other ‘indigenous varieties’. To say it with her:

Up until the late nineteenth century only those linguistic categories which were found in classical Indo-European languages were accorded due status and investigated in some depth. Since these languages have no grammaticalized information source, the concept of evidentiality had not made its way into linguistics until ‘exotic’ languages started being described in terms of categories relevant to them. (Aikhenvald, 2004: 11)

Since European languages did not seem to have a strong evidential system (De Haan, 1999) (i.e. a grammatical way of expressing whether the information presented was ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’) evidentials were not the center of attention in linguistic studies. Actually, even though other types of evidential-like approaches were made, the label of EVIDENTIAL is relatively recent. Its origin can be traced back to the work of Frank Boas on Kwakiutl grammar in 1911, where he examined suffixes denoting source of information. More concretely, an evidential was defined later on as “a small group of suffixes [which] expresses source and certainty of knowledge” (Boas, 1947: 236-245). This definition, as there will be seen, corresponds to what has been called *grammatical evidentiality*.

It is a common thing among scholars to track the notion of evidentiality back to Boas’ work; however, it was not until Jakobson (1957) that evidentials were taken to be grammatical categories. In an essay entitled “Shifters, Verbal Categories and Russian Verb”, he introduced the notion as a way for labeling linguistic expressions (Whitt, 2010) by saying that an evidential was a ‘verbal category’ that accounted for three things: a narrated event ( $E^n$ ), a speech event ( $E^s$ ), and a narrated speech event ( $E^{ns}$ ) - this last being the source of information.

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<sup>3</sup> Here the debate can be open to whether it is essential to consider an evidential as a type of grammatical category or not. For this task, there has to be a definition of both concepts: evidentiality and grammatical category. It is not the matter of this work to deal with such an issue.

What can be drawn from this functional approach is basically Jakobson's attempt to make a sharp distinction between mood and evidentiality as independent categories (Aikhenvald, 2004). On one hand, mood is being characterized by the relation between the narrated event ( $E^n$ ) and the participants (P) of the event; and, on the other hand, evidentiality is being characterized by the relation between the tree parts of the narrative:  $E^n E^s / E^{ns}$ . Additionally, by studying the Bulgarian verb conjugation<sup>4</sup>, Jakobson distinguished 'direct narration' (where  $E^{ns} = E^s$ ) from 'indirect narration' (where  $E^{ns} \neq E^s$ ). His proposal would eventually have a 'terminological evolution', where evidence acquired perceptually would be considered to be 'direct' type of evidence; whereas reasoned or inferred evidence would be considered to be types of 'indirect' evidentiality<sup>5</sup>.

There have been some problems regarding *evidentiality* and its definition as part of the grammatical mental space. Many questions arise when a concept does not appear equally in all languages. My aim until this point has been three-sided: firstly, to see in what sense evidentiality has been related to modality, arriving to the conclusion that *inference* can be a core property of both. Since grammatical marking of a given category seems to be a necessary condition to be considered by any serious characterization of a grammar, I have also reviewed Anderson's descriptive analysis of *evidential markers*. Lastly, I have made a broad review of the literature concerning the origins and evolution of the concept.

The next section will be devoted to exploring in much more depth the well-known confrontation between *evidentiality* and *modality*.

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<sup>4</sup> When witnessing an event in which a steamship sailed, a Bulgarian can say either the form *zaminala* 'it is claimed to have sailed' ('indirect narration': where  $E^m \neq E^s$ ) or the form *zamina* 'I bear witness; it sailed' ('direct narration: where  $E^{ms} = E^s$ ) (example taken from Whit, 2010).

<sup>5</sup> For De Haan (1999), the distinction between both types of evidence is to be found in whether the evidence presented by the speaker is 'more' or 'less' believable.

## 2. Evidentials and epistemic modals

In this section the distinction between *evidentials* and *epistemic modals* is put forward. For the case of *evidentials*, I will review some of the main classifications and definitions made so far. Generally speaking, there can be found three model-type languages: those in which evidentiality is morphologically encoded (Quechua, Tariana); those in which evidentiality is not found morphologically, hence ‘evidential strategies’ have to be used to express source of information (Spanish, English, German); those in which evidentiality is expressed morphologically and have lexical reinforcement (Georgian).

As for the case of *epistemic modals*, there will be seen that confusion with *evidentiality* may arise in some languages

### 2.1. Evidentials

As exposed earlier, there has been a long-lasting dispute over the link between *evidentiality* and *epistemic modality*. It has been stated that evidentials might be a subdomain of epistemic modals (Palmer, 1986) (meaning that their study must fit into the syntax-semantic interface and not into the pragmatic-syntax interface). In this line, Aikhenvald (2004:7) has a categoric opinion: “Evidentiality is a category in its own right, and not a subcategory of any modality”. According to her, scholars tend to assume that evidentials are modals “because of their absence in most European languages”. Thus, the tendency is to convert evidentials into epistemic markers. De Haan (1999), on the contrary, draws a border between both concepts stating that while evidentiality *deals* with the source of information, epistemic modality is concerned with the speakers’ *degree of commitment* towards the utterance.

All and all, evidentiality is often described as *related* to the source of information, has a perceptual basis and relies on the speakers’ attitude towards the *validity* of the information presented. Among the literature, it has been a common strategy to divide evidentiality into two types: *direct* and *indirect*. One of the best-known examples of this division is shown below:




Figure 1: The semantic domain of evidentiality

(From Willet, 1988: 57)

While *direct evidentials* are used when the speaker has witnessed the action (or to say it differently: when information of a given even is taken to be witnessed from *firsthand*, attested either visually, auditory or in other perceptual way), *indirect evidentials* are used when the speaker has not witnessed the event but deduced (inferred) or heard it from others (reported). For instance, Quechua, a language with a strong evidential system (de Haan, 1991), has three types of evidentials (which are always enclitical): direct, reportative and conjectural (inferential).

### Quechua

(2) wañu-nqa-paq-**mi**

‘It will die’ (assertion)

(3) wañu-nqa-paq-**shi**

‘It will die’ (I was told)

(4) wañu-nqa-paq-**chi**

‘It will die’ (perhaps)

(cited by Demonte and Fernández Soriano, 2014:226)

Another example is Tariana, an Arawak language spoken in the area of the Vaupés in the northwest of the Amazonia. In this language, it is obligatory for speakers to mark whether they saw the event, heard of it, or knew about it by means of others. To put it differently, in

languages such as Tariana, one cannot say simply ‘José has played football’; rather than this, one has to say something like ‘José played football (**we saw the event of José playing football happening**)’. This marking is achieved by a fusion between evidentials and tense.

Tariana

(5) Juse irida     di-     manika-     **ka**  
 José football 3sgn- play-     REC.P.VIS (we saw the event)

(6) Juse irida     di-     manika-     **pidaka**  
 José football 3sgn- play-     REC.P.REP (we were told that the event happened)

(From Aikhenvald, 2004: 2)

In (5) we can see that the particle **-ka** marks both: that the event was witnessed visually and that it happened in a recent time, meaning that the same morpheme encodes both grammatical categories: means of acquiring information and tense. This is marked by the particle **-pidaka** in (6), where it can be attested that the event happened in a recent time, as in (5), but the information was acquired by means of others (‘Someone told us that John has played football (and we were amazed that he had the physical strength to do so)’).

What characterizes an evidential is its faculty to provide the *source of information* of a given event *witnessed* by a speaker. It is certain that every language in the world has its own way of expressing where information came from. However, not in every language this expression occurs morphologically (by means of affixes, suffixes and so on). There are also ‘lexical means’<sup>6</sup> to refer to the source of information. In Spanish, for instance, evidentiality might not be considered to be a grammatical category because it can be expressed in various ways, such as adverbial expressions like ‘*supuestamente*’ (case of indirect evidentiality) or introductory verbal clauses with complementation markers like ‘*veo que*’ (case of direct evidentiality) and because in Spanish (like in other Romance varieties) evidentiality is always optional, as opposed to Tariana or Quechua, where evidential markedness is obligatory and always morphological:

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<sup>6</sup> Having lexical means (or syntactic free choices) for specifying the source of knowledge is probably a universal characteristic of languages (Aikhenvald, 2004). Having exclusively ‘grammatical means’ for the same purposes seems to be restricted only to some languages. Interestingly enough, Aikhenvald’s book aims ‘to present a functional-typological, empirically based, account of grammatical evidentiality across the world’s languages’ (p. 19), leaving aside languages with ‘lexical evidentiality’.

### Case of grammatical evidentiality (Quechua)

- (7) Iriqi- kuna      chakra -pi-      **n**                      puklla-sha-n-ku  
child-PL              field      -LOC- **mi**                      play – PROG-3-PL  
‘The children are playing in the field (I see them)’

(From Faller, 2002)

### Case of lexical evidentiality (Spanish)

- (8) **Veo que**                      los niño-s      jueg-an                      en la cancha  
EV: ‘I see that’                      child - PL      play-3sng                      LOC-field

‘I see that the children are playing in the field’

(The example is mine)

With this, seems obvious that the form in which evidentiality is expressed is different in each case: in the case of (7), the particle **-n/mi** is expressing the fact that the speaker is seeing the children playing in the field; it is a case of MORPHOLOGICAL DIRECT EVIDENTIAL MARKING; as in (8) the expression **veo que** (‘I see that’) expresses the same fact but with lexical resources and it represents a case of LEXICAL DIRECT EVIDENTIAL MARKING<sup>7</sup>.

Besides this distinction between grammatical and lexical evidentiality (and systems where the distinction can be clear enough), there are languages, such as Georgian (for the whole case study, see Gäumann, 2011) where evidentials are can appear in both senses: grammatical and lexical:

### Georgian

- (9) man                      sk’am- i                      aivan-ze                      dadga.  
s/he:ERG                      chair-NOM                      balcony-on                      put:3sgn.  
‘S/he put the chair in the balcony’

- (10) man                      sk’am-i                      aivan-ze                      **daugams.**  
s/he:ERG                      chair-NOM                      balcony-on                      stand:PRF.3sgn  
‘As it seems, s/he put the chair in the balcony’

- (11) man                      sk’am-i                      aivan-ze                      (xširad)                      daudgams                      **turme.**  
s/he:DAT                      chair-NOM                      balcony-on                      (often)                      stand:PRF.3SG **EV.**

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<sup>7</sup> As there will be seen later on, this *label* also goes in the literature by the name of ‘evidential strategies’. The concept of strategy emerges from the fact that in some languages, especially non-european, evidentiality is not expressed by morphological means. This forces the system to ‘find’ other ways in which information can be expressed.

‘Apparently, s/he has (often) put the chair in the balcony’

(From Gäumann, 2011)

Evidential marking in example (10) is similar to the prototypical described cases from Quechua, in the sense that there is some part from the word **daugams** that provides information about the event ‘Putting the chair in the balcony’. Note, however, that in (10) the evidential marker appears to be attached to the morphological value of mood (perfect tense: PERF) and expressed somewhere in the word **daugams**. In (11), on the other hand, evidential marking is reinforced and reinterpreted from the synthetical relationship between aspect of **dadga** (PRF3sgn: **daugams**) and from the word **turme**. As we will see, this evidential reinforcement also appears in Spanish.

Evidentiality became a matter of linguistic investigation until very recently and it is still a matter of debate whether it should be considered as category in its own right or whether it has to be considered as a part of an already-established category like epistemic modality. The cases shown above are cases in which evidential marking is clear enough to be identified as such. However, there are languages, especially those with LEXICAL EVIDENTIAL MARKING, where the distinction is much more difficult to grasp. For this reason, now I would like to turn my attention towards *epistemic modality*.

## 2.1. Epistemic modals

*Epistemic modality* relies on the speaker’s *commitment* and the *degree of certainty* of the information presented (i.e. the evaluation given over a proposition). *The Oxford Concise Dictionary of Linguistics* (TCDL) defines the term modality as a “category covering either a kind of speech act or the degree of certainty with which something is said”. It is, by all means, a *semantic category* and commonly covers the notions of possibility, probability, necessity, volition, obligation, and permission. In the same line, Palmer (1986) says that “modality is one of a number of semantic-grammatical features” (p.1). For him, modality (being epistemic or not) is a grammatical category that falls into the scope of the semantics. However, he makes a distinction from other grammatical categories by saying that the situation with modality is different because, as opposed to time, it is difficult to define (Palmer, 1986: 2).

According to de Haan (1991) “Epistemic modality *evaluates* evidence and on the basis of this evaluation assigns a confidence measure to the speaker’s utterance”. This definition



is based on how the evidence of an event is evaluated. Rather than focusing on a strict categorization of both concepts, he describes their relationship with a speaker's assertion over an event and explains that the fundamental difference is within the scope of interpretation.

Another definition of *epistemic modality* is put forward by Nyut (2000), to whom *epistemic modality* is the linguistic expression of an evaluation of the chances that a certain hypothetical state of affairs under consideration (of some aspect of it) will occur, is occurring, or has occurred in a possible world. Seems natural to notice the definitions of *epistemic modality* are different in each case: while de Haan focuses on how an event is *evaluated*, Nyut focuses on the *evaluation of the chances* that a modal of some sort can provide over a witnessed event. Importantly, both definitions avoid the strict categorization that the Oxford dictionary and Palmer make.

To put it simply: *modality* is basically used to distinguish sentences where the speaker commits to the truthfulness of his/her utterance from sentences where the speaker does not do this, as opposed to evidentiality, where the main function is to provide *where* the information came from.

For instance, let us take the examples (12) and (13) in English as guidelines:

(12) Trump is the president of USA.

(13) Trump *must* be the president of USA.

It is certain that in (12) and (13) the unfortunate information provided by the sentence is the same in both cases: 'Trump being the president of the USA'. However, there seems to be more things beyond information. Even though both are the same proposition, (12) being paraphrased as (13), in (13) the speaker is not committing to the truthfulness of what s/he is uttering; the *modal* 'must' in this case, is telling us that the speaker is providing the information of Trump being the president of USA without knowing if the fact is actually true or not. Ultimately, it can be seen that *epistemic modality* relies necessarily on *how* the speaker relates with the information presented. Another English-like example is the one concerning German modal verbs:

#### German

(14) Karen **soll** nicht am Tatarot gewesen sein.

‘Karen [is said] not to have been at the crime scene’

(15) Karen **will** nicht am Tatort gewesen sein.

‘Karen [claims] not to have been at the crime scene’

(16) Karen **muss** nicht am Tatort gewesen sein.

‘Karen [must] not have been at the crime scene.’

(From Whitt, 2011:13)

In these particular cases, while *sollen* and *wollen* can be taken to be identified as markers of reported information (first-hand information for the case of *wollen* and hearsay for the case of *sollen*), *müssen* seems to indicate an inference process. However, identifying whether in (16) *muss* is an evidential or not seems to be a difficult task and it exceeds the intentions of this work. Broadly speaking, if taken to be a modal, it is mainly because it can be appreciated that the speaker introduces the statement with a certain degree of doubt. This reading occurs because the operator *muss* (‘must’) provides us with this lecture. In other words: when activated, it gives us the information that the speaker has a doubt over the evidence (‘Karen being or not at the crime scene’) and not about the source of information. Hence, ‘must’ has to be interpreted as a *modal* and not as an *evidential*. Otherwise, if taken to be an *evidential*, ‘must’ has to fall into the scope of indirect type of evidentiality, providing us the inference that the speaker does not know whether Karen has been or not at the crime scene.

It has been outlined that there has been considerable effort in defining *evidentials* and separating them from modals. Even though having similar properties, it appears that *evidentials* and *epistemic modals* are two different objects of linguistic inquiry. Although the distinction might be useful at a certain point, there are (at least) two things undeniable about both concepts: that to some extent both are strictly related to a proposition P (on *how* they give information about the world: either they present the *way it is acquired* or express the *degree of certainty*) and that both tell us something about the relation that the speaker has regarding the information that s/he is presenting when s/he speaks<sup>8</sup>. Descriptively, both concepts are different. However, there are some languages, especially those that do not have evidentials as part of their grammar, in which barrier between one and the other is blurring,

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<sup>8</sup> However, there are some cases in which *modality* and *evidentiality* are closely related. Even though the case of ‘must’ might at all lights taken to be an *epistemic modal* (used prototypically as an example among the modality literature), I believe that it can fit perfectly into the scope of evidentiality, since some evidentials might have epistemic coloring.

hence, evidentials are not always detected ‘at sight’. Because of this fact, evidential marking occurs by means of ‘other strategies’ (see note 7), such as gathering syntactic objects and giving them a pragmatic meaning. This categorization by means of several syntactical items is what goes by the name of ‘evidential strategy’ and is associated to languages that do not have morphosyntactic evidentiality.

In the next section I would like to put forward this strategy used in a language with a non-proper evidential system, such as Spanish. I will focus my attention mainly in two related objects that have a close historical relationship: *dizque* and *dice que*. Before going into much more detail, it is important to highlight that while *dizque* has a wide use in what goes with the name of American Spanish, *dice que* is used by all Spanish speakers.

## II. Some evidentials in Spanish

### 3. *Dice que* and *dizque*

Spanish is a language that does not have a morphological way of marking where the speaker acquired the information s/he is presenting. In this section, I would like to explore this particular situation by taking two linguistic objects and comparing them with each other. A general characterization of the Spanish *dice que* and *dizque* is shown in the next paragraphs.

#### 3.1. *Dice que*

As I have stated earlier, another way to distinguish between lexical and morphological evidentiality is by referring to ‘evidential strategies’ (Aikhenvald, 2004). These syntactic-like strategies are used in languages that do not have evidentials encoded in their grammar. In Spanish, as in English, German, and in Romance varieties, *evidentials* are lexically encoded. What happens in these languages is that the expression of evidentiality occurs in non-morphological manifestation. Let us take, for instance, the language that is our object of investigation. In Spanish, the verb *decir* (from Latin: DICĒRE) is highly productive because of its use frequency. It is considered to be a performative verb since it involves the action of speaking. Its fundamental structure is composed by the inflected verb *decir* (‘to say’ > ‘s/he says’) of the given variety<sup>9</sup> (American or non-American Spanish) and the complementizer *que* (‘that’) resulting ultimately in the formula: verb + complementizer.

(17) E renuncio la ley que **dice que** los testigos de la carta deven ver fazer la paga de dineros o de cosa que lo vala... (CORDE, Anónimo, *Carta de acuerdo*, Spain, 1314)

(18) Lieua la martiniega del dicho logar por el rey ferrant rodrigues fijo de ferrant rodrigues de villalobos por cambio que **dice que** fizo con el rey e esla cabeza de la martiniega ochenta e ocho... (CORDE, Anónimo, *Becerro de las behetrías de Castilla*, Spain, 1352).

(19) Gonzalo de Berceo **dice que** “unas tierras dan vino, otras dan dinero”, como tributo a San Millán. La literatura nos va reseñando apariciones sueltas del dinero como fogonazos, siquiera éstos sean cada vez más

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<sup>9</sup> As it is commonly known, the pronominal and verbal systems in Spanish varies from region to region.

extensos y frecuentes. (CREA, Pedro Voltes, *Historia de la peseta*, Spain 2001)

(20) Darío **dice que** Andrea, su hermana, es adicta al laburo (Alberto Salcedo Ramos, *Viaje al Macondo real y otras crónicas*, 2016: 95, 104)

While the first two examples are taken from Spanish historical documents, the other two examples are taken from more actual texts. As there can be seen from all of the above examples, *dice que* is composed by two whole independent forms: a VP (*dice*) and its complementizer (*que*). Each one of those linguistic objects have their own independent and expressive syntactical function: *dice* fills out the predication and the *que*-complementizer, structurally common in Spanish verbal forms (such as *creer que*, *pensar que* and so on), introduces a subordinate clause (S<sub>2</sub>) that functions as a direct object of the main predication. However, to acquire full predicative meaning the first blank of its ‘argument spaces’ (*\_\_ dice que \_\_*) has to be filled by a NP, while the second one has to be filled by a VP (i.e. a subordinate sentence: S<sub>2</sub>).

*Dice que* is also a case of reported information (or quotative), this meaning that the information provided is acquired indirectly. Importantly, information from S<sub>2</sub> must be an *event* of some sort. In this same line, *dice que* may classify as a LEXICAL (INDIRECT) EVIDENTIAL MARKER (LEM henceforth) (Aihkenvald, 2004), because it gives us the following informative tokens: that an event (e) of some sort is happening, and that the event is being referred by someone who is not the speaker. Being said this, a ‘pragmatic structure’ can be seen, where there can be three identifiable parts: the grammatical label (LEM), the linguistic tokens (*dice* and *que*) and the pragmatical information provided (‘Someone else-who is not the speaker- says P to be so’ or ‘P was not directly witnessed’<sup>10</sup>). Descriptively speaking, *dice que* can be found, as well, in a dislocated narrative:

(21) Darío **dice** a su primo **que** Andrea, su hermana, es adicta al laburo  
‘Darío says to his cousin that Andrea, his sister, is a work addict’

(Example modified from (20))

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<sup>10</sup> This being so, it would be a case of second-hand information in Whillet’s terminology (see § 2).

The fact that the form *dice que* is reformulated in (21) as *dice...que* does not change the fact that *dice que* functions as an evidential marker, mainly because it still expresses the source of knowledge.

### 3.2. *Dizque*

The *Nueva Gramática de la Lengua Española* describes the use of *dizque* as related to its verbal old form *diz*: “Al verbo *decir* pertenece la antigua forma monosilábica *diz*, pero no se usó como imperativo. Pervive hoy el adverbio *dizque* (‘al parecer’, ‘presuntamente’) más usado en ciertas áreas del español americano.” [The verb *decir* belongs to the old monosyllabic form *diz*, but did not had an imperative use. The adverb *dizque* is still used, especially in some American Spanish areas]<sup>11</sup>. Accordingly, the *Diccionario de la Real Academia Española* (2014), *dizque* can be used in two senses: one as a noun (mostly in its plural form)<sup>12</sup> and the other one as an adverb. This work is only focused on the adverbial functioning of *dizque*.

As the correlative grammaticalized form of *dice que*, the case of *dizque* is similar to the ‘*müss/must*’ case, mainly because its consideration as a type of evidential marking is not clear enough. It is frequently found in colloquial registers in a vast territory that starts in Mexico and goes all the way through Central America, ending in the Andean region. Originally, the form *dizque* consisted of the verb ‘say’ and a complementizer ‘that’. As a result of grammaticalization, the form developed into a particle or a verbal modifier, ultimately acquiring new epistemic functions. This is shown in the examples below. While (22a) and (22b) correspond to uses accepted in all Spanish varieties, realization of (22c) is accepted only in some American Spanish varieties:

(22) a. **Dic-e**        **que**        fueron al cine  
           say-THV        COMP        went    to the movies  
           ‘S/he says that they went to the movies’

b. **Dic-e-n**    **que**    fueron al cine  
           say-THV-3PL COMP went    to the movies  
           ‘They say that they went to the movies’

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<sup>11</sup> Translation is mine.

<sup>12</sup> The use of *dizque* as a noun is unknown to me.

c. **Dizque** fueron al cine  
 DIZQUE went to the movies  
 ‘Supposedly they went to the movies’

Different epistemic realizations can be noted from the examples shown above, even though all of them have the same informational token of ‘someone(s) going to the movies’. The pragmatic information that can be abstracted from (22c) has two values: in the first place, that the event was not witnessed by the speaker; in the second place, that the speaker puts into doubt P: ‘they going to the movies’. Even though *dizque* might have more than two meanings (see § 5.1) it is widely recognized as a particle that gives quotative and reportative information:

(23) scuderos & otras personas no vsadas de tener judgado, los quales *dizque* fazen injusticias & estorsiones a los vezinos de la tierra, & no dan cuenta de la administraci3n de la justicia que es a su cargo a los alcaldes mayores de la çibdad. (CORDE, *Ordenanzas reales de la ciudad de Sevilla*, Espa1a, 1492).

(24) Fueron a verlo las dos personas dichas a la casa do vivía el D. Francisco, y a una parte della *dizque* vieron cierta cantidad de rodela de oro y de plata (CORDE, *Cuarta relaci3n an3nima de la jornada que hizo Nu1o de Guzmán a la Nueva Galicia*, M3xico, 1544).

(25) En la tienda Aguacanelas les dieron dinero y las motivaron a modelar con el fot3grafo, *dizque* profesional, despu3s de que fueron a la calle 147, a donde fueron bien vestidas. Nunca m3s las volví a ver. (CREA, *Prensa*, Colombia, 1998).

(26) A ciertas cosas las destruyen los a1os. A otras, nos referimos a metales y piedras preciosas, las valorizan y aquilatan. A unos licores *dizque* los espiritualizan. Poco sabemos de esto. Los 3rboles y algunos animales envejecen mucho m3s que el hombre, mas al fin sucumben. (CREA, *Prensa*, Honduras, 2004).

Since *dizque* is not meant to be a VP, such as the case of *dice que*, even though internally it has remains of verbal significance, it does not have the same ‘structural analysis’. Rather than this, the form only requires ‘one position’ to be filled to have a complete predication

(*dizque*\_\_\_\_), resulting the next structure [*dizque* [S,NP,PP,etc]]. In examples (23-25) it functions as a ‘proposition modifier’ (i.e. a complete sentence); whereas in (26) it alters the meaning of the NP “professional”. Sameness to *dice que* can be found in the sense that it also has an underlying grammatical label (LEM) that is filled by a linguistic token (*dizque*) that gives some sort of informative value over the proposition presented (‘That the “whatever comes next” is put under the scope of doubt’’).

Interestingly, *dizque* can combine with both: sentence-like and non-sentence objects (‘sus *dizque* amigos’, for instance, is also grammatically available<sup>13</sup>). Furthermore, *dizque* can be filled out by contextual cues, to prevent the repetition of information, contrary to the case of *dice que*:

(27) - ¿Sus amigos fueron al cine?

- **Dizque**

‘- Their friends went to the movies?’

- Supposedly (it is true that their friends went to the movies)’

It seems to be enough evidence to realize that there are many differences between the analyzed units (*dice que* ≠ *dizque*). Besides having the same pragmatic structure (i.e. LEM), they both convey a different pragmatic meaning: on one hand, *dice que* is used to present reported information (‘as said by someone else’), on the other, *dizque* is mainly used to express uncertainty about a given event. However, it is unavoidable to find out that there is a close relationship that unites both of them (*dice que* = *dizque*): that the reported information has not been witnessed by the speaker.

The next section of this work is devoted precisely to analyze the historical relationship between both of them.

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<sup>13</sup> For discussion of distribution and meaning of *dizque* see §5.



### III. Evolution and actual uses of *dizque*

#### 4. Possible origins of *dizque*

Since *dizque* has a long history in Spanish, in this section, firstly, I outline some of the hypothesis that might arise when giving an explanation about languages with ‘evidential strategies’; secondly, I make a broad revision of some of the notions and definitions made over grammaticalization, a core process of linguistic change, finally, I relate this process of conversion with *dizque* and explain how *diz. que* might have been evolved into *dizque*.

According to Alcázar (2014), three different hypotheses can be found regarding the origin of *dizque* as an evidential. The first one is called SUBSTRATE INFLUENCE. This type of influence might be a consequence from the contact between Spanish and indigenous languages with grammatical evidentiality. Though this theory is suggestive, it seems to be not that much tenable since *dizque* usage is also found in locations where Spanish was not influenced by indigenous grammar (see §5). However, as it is difficult to track tokens of *dizque* from the Old Spanish in American territory, remains uncertain if *dizque* was in fact influenced by evidentiality in those ‘original’ languages.

The second hypothesis that Alcázar entertains is the one called NATIVE DEVELOPMENT. He notes that, if taken collectively, recent research on evidentiality points towards the direction where Spanish might be a language with multiple ‘emergent evidentials’, making *dizque* to fall into that category.

Finally, the third hypothesis that Alcázar entertains is the one regarding its HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT (i.e. grammaticalization, subjetivization and so on) across Spanish dialects or/and Romance varieties. In this sense, there is a lot of evidence that shows that *dizque* is a Pan-Hispanic phenomenon, dating back to the Old Spanish. According to him, the latter hypothesis might be compatible with the acceleration of grammaticalization in Spanish and Portuguese.

Since it seems to me that grammaticalization to be the more plausible option of the presented hypothesis, I will like to explore some of the notions made over this concept among scholars.

#### 4.1. Notions of grammaticalization

Languages change through time. Studies about linguistic change are abundant; they not only show which are the initial and the final states of a word evolution, but also the causes that enable such processes. One of the many processes upon which linguistic evolutionary phenomenon is studied is grammaticalization. Here, a ‘free form’ acquires the final state of a well-attached-form grammatical category. Simply put, grammaticalization can be seen as a process where a lexical item or syntactic free structure assumes a grammatical function, or where a grammatical item assumes a *more* grammatical function.

Grammaticalization is a phenomenon that has a long history in diachronic studies, and it has been useful for understanding the development of recent studies in historical syntax. Antoine Meillet was the first one who introduced the term, which he defined as “l’attribution du caractère grammatical à un mot jades autonome” (Meillet, 1912:131). By opening the scope of grammaticalization, Lehmann (1986) adopts a synchronic and a diachronic view of the process. He states that while grammaticalization (seen diachronically) converts lexemes into what he calls ‘grammatical formatives’, grammaticalization (seen synchronically) provides the proper subcategorization principles where a grammatical category might be ordered.

A broader definition of grammaticalization (‘grammatization’, to use his term) is made by Hopper, who sees grammaticalization as a substitute for grammar, arguing that grammar is always emergent but never specific. Hopper sees grammar as separate from performance, because, in his words, “Grammar is not to be understood as a prerequisite for discourse” (Hopper, 1987:142). He also introduces the term “emergent grammar”, which suggests that “structure, or regularity, comes out of discourse and is shaped by discourse”. (Hopper, *ibid.*) In the same line as Hopper, Company (2003) sees that grammaticalization consists in the “fixation of discursive strategies” that is dialectically opposed to syntax (and grammar-like derivations), in which, eventually, the forces that interact are never resolved because the “essence of language is its constant and imperceptible transformation” (Company, 2003: 11).

Rather than seeing a grammaticalization process, Company (2004) argues that in some cases words may suffer the process of *subjetivization*, where the speaker evaluates whatever s/he is communicating and encodes it into the grammar of a given language. She states that speakers may find an explicit codification of pragmatic meanings and, even further, that

according to the listener, they might find interactions and social proximity. For her, one of the particles that suffered such a process was precisely *dizque*.

Another approach to grammaticalization is made by Heine, Claudi and Hünnemeyer (1991). These authors claim that grammaticalization should be studied considering linguistic and extralinguistic factors. Their framework pays especial attention to the relationship between grammar and cognition. As opposed to Hopper, their model resides on the assumption that grammar and cognition must be understood as whole, and that grammaticalization is initiated by ‘forces that are located outside language structure’ (Heine, Claudi and Hünnemeyer, 1991: 24). While for Hopper grammar and language has a syntax-dependant attachment (in the sense that interactions modify the structural basis of language), for Lehman, Meillet and Heine, language change is seen exclusively as the transition between one form and the other, without contemplating the fact that language use, and the interactive forces between what speakers utter, determines, essentially, the way in which language change.

Since evidentials are pragmatic markers, seems more suitable to be side-by-side with the theory of grammaticalization that is defined over the grounding of the syntax-pragmatics interface. However, it is also true that, independently from whichever definition we adopt, either the one relying on the interactions between use and structure (i.e. Hopper and Company) or the one relying on the interactions between grammar and cognition (i.e. Lehmann, Heine, Meillet), grammaticalization (or equal processes described with different words) ought to be seen as one of the core processes in language evolution. For this reason, in the next section, I would like to explore in more detail the process of grammaticalization that converted *diz que* into its correlated brother form *dizque*.

#### **4.2. Grammaticalization of *diz que***

The process of grammaticalization, as stated above, can be found in all languages known by us (for an early grammaticalization theory see Meillet, 1912; for development of grammaticalization theory see Lehmann, 1986; Hopper, 1987; and Heine, 1991). Concretely speaking, in Spanish, for example, the word ‘alrededor’ (‘around of’) has been formed by adding *a* (grammatical item: PREPOSITION) to *el* (grammatical item: ARTICLE) to *rededor* (lexical item: ‘the surroundings’), ultimately reaching the word *alrededor*. An equal procedure applies to *dizque*, where *diz que* (essentially meaning ‘he says that’) acquired the

fused form of *dizque* ('supposedly'). The *Diccionario de autoridades* (1732) already registered that *dizque* was found to be a result of the "Contraction of voices Dicen que, used very frequently to abbreviate the phrase" [Contracción de las voces Dicen que, usada muy frecuentemente para abreviar la locución]. This definition, even though it describes grammaticalization in its "first state", is ambiguous in the sense that it does not attribute *dizque* its adverbial use; rather than this, it gives *dizque* the same semantic value as *diz que*.

However, before going more into detail, for understanding the wholeness of the evolutionary process, it is important to mention that Spanish suffered a general apocopation of the vowel /e/ during the XII and XIII centuries. Lapesa (1981) in his *Historia de la lengua española* approaches this phenomenon by saying that:

Por una parte, el lenguaje del siglo XII ofrece, aunque muy en decadencia, mantenimiento de la /e/ latina en casos donde más tarde había de ser forzosa la pérdida, esto es, tras /r/, /s/, /l/, /n/, /z/ y /d/. Pero al mismo tiempo la caída vocal final se propagó con extraordinaria virulencia después de otras consonantes y grupos [...] Desde principios del siglo XIII son rarísimos los ejemplos de /-e/ final conservada tras alveolares /z/ o /d/ y formas como *verament*, *omnipotent*, *fuert*, *fizist*, quedan entonces menos en desacuerdo con la evolución natural de la lengua. (Lapesa, 1981: 208)

'On the one hand, language from the XII century offers, though very much in decay, the maintenance of the latin /e/ in cases where later on the loss was unavoidable, this is, behind /r/, /s/, /l/, /n/, /z/ and /d/. But at the same time the loss of the final vowel was extended with extraordinary virulence after other consonants and groups [...] From the beginnings of the XIII century it is rare to find the examples of final /-e/ preserved after alveolar sounds /z/ o /d/ and therefore forms like *verament*, *omnipotent*, *fuert*, *fizist*, clash with the natural evolution of the language.' (Translation is mine)


This phonological reduction of the final /-e/ caused that some verbal forms, *diz* being one of them, were affected (*tien*, *vien* can also be found in 'Old Spanish' texts). During the XV century, however, there can be found examples where the not-yet-apocopated *dize que* and the apocopated *diz que* are used without the ungrammaticalized value (i.e. both still have a verbal value and are formally separated), as shown in example (28).

(28) e a la ley e el derecho que **dize que** en el logar donde fuere conprometido que alli sea juzgado, e a la otra ley en que **diz que** la ynziçion que fuere dada contra derecho non bala. (CORDE<sup>14</sup>, Anónimo, *Sentencia de propiedad*, 1496).

Finally, a phonological restitution of the final /-e/ will occur during the XVI century and would correspond to one of the regularization processes of Modern Spanish (Lapesa, 1985: 257).

Having set the historical background, it is undeniable to notice two things: one, that initially the ‘medieval *diz que*’ was two sided: *dize que* and its apocopated *diz (e) que*; two, that the latter entered a “grammaticalization channel” and ultimately evolve into a grammatical item. For explanatory purposes, the whole process is summarized in the following diagram:

Grammaticalization of *diz que*



Note that the evolution of *dizque* is “binarily dislocated”: while the upper part describes the restitution of the apocopated /e/: /ø/ “z” > /œ/ “ce” and has no semantic change (as it still means ‘says that’), the lower part shows a grammatical “open-gate”<sup>15</sup>, where *diz que* entered the grammaticalization channel, producing its non-verbal [-V] use<sup>16</sup>.

With respect to a description of the grammaticalization of *diz que* (i.e. the lower part), Magaña (2005) has notice that what happened in the grammaticalization channel was that

<sup>14</sup> Even though the CORDE is a great tool for historic approximation of language change, it is certain that CORDE has limited representative examples of the varieties of Spanish that are not peninsular, and its database is essentially composed by examples of Spanish authors (not Latin American authors).

<sup>15</sup> Alcázar (2014) sees that the phonological reduction of *dizque* entailed the process of grammaticalization and its further syntactic reconfiguration in the Spanish-language-type system.

<sup>16</sup> Grammaticalization has also been studied in relation to the minimalist framework (Roberts and Roussou, 2003), where, roughly speaking, V-elements (i.e. verbal phrases) are alleged to transform into T-markers (like modals in English). Because of the purposes and limitations of this work, it is impossible to me to develop further explanation of such theory here.

there was a slow loss of the referential subject. The whole evolutionary state of the art can be seen, broadly speaking, in three steps. Examples are put accordingly and below each one of the steps:

(i) *diz que* <sup>(1)</sup> > *diz que* <sup>(2)</sup>: The *diz* has a whole verbal meaning, the complementizer *que* introduces a subordinate clause and there is an identifiable subject. This can be seen in (29), where the subject of the *diz que* is clearly identifiable and goes from ‘los dichos Alcaldes’ all the way through ‘oficios’. The other type of *diz que* does not have an identifiable subject and it becomes void in its functional structure, yet its complete verbal meaning remains, as seen in example (30).

(29) y que despues que el Licenciado Cristóbal de Toro Juez de residencia que fue de ese dicho Condado les hubo tomado la residencia que pudo haber quince años, los dichos Alcaldes y sus Tenientes que han tenido y tienen los dichos oficios ***diz que*** no han hecho residencia porque no les ha sido tomada (CORDE, Anónimo, *Provisión Real del Consejo dando comisión al Corregidor de Vizcaya*, Spain, 1507)

(30) mercaderías, y si el Maestre fuere de la tal nao carga las dichas mercaderías en sus navíos ***diz que*** le hacen pagar al Maestre ó mercader diez maravedís por cada quintal de hierro (CORDE, *Provisión Real del Consejo mandando que en los puertos de Vizcaya y Guipúzcoa no se obligue a cargar*, Spain, 1505)

(ii) *diz que* <sup>(2)</sup> > *dizque* <sup>(3)</sup>: The *diz que* <sup>(2)</sup> without subject suffers an univerbation process, resulting in *dizque* <sup>(3)</sup>; hence, the verbal meaning is weakened and the pragmatic value of ‘I’m not sure’ is reinforced, as seen in (31), where there is a coexistence of properties. Or to say it differently, even though the form is different (*dizque* and *diz que*) both collide into one same meaning: ‘supposedly’:

(31) e que desta manera continuamente hestavan dichas alcaldas en un linaje de personas, y que ellos se tomavan las quantas los unos a los otros, por que los dichos sus partes se agrabiaban dello suso dicho e ***dizque*** dieron orden que se elijiesen por suertes, y que como no hestava vien a los que ansi heran alcaldes, ***diz que*** no la guardaron y que por quebrantarlo e no hestar por la mi jurisdiccion real pusieron en la dicha eleccion canonigos y otras personas

eclesiasticas y por esta causa la justicia e jurisdiccion dela dicha villa estava perdida” (CORDE, *Modo y forma de elegir a los alcaldes*, Spain, 1512)


(iii) *dizque* (3) > *dizque* (4): Finally, *dizque* (3) turned into *dizque* (4) by no longer admitting negation markers. The form ‘fossilizes’ and it can admit other *que*-tokens within its structure:

(32) Fueron a verlo las dos personas dichas a la casa do vivía el D. Francisco, y a una parte della ***dizque*** vieron cierta cantidad de rodela de oro y de plata; de los cuales se puede recibir juramento qué tanto sería, que yo no lo vi, sino por oídas, y fue público que lo tuvo preso quince días. (CORDE, *Cuarta relación anónima*, Mexico, 1544)

(33) Todos éstos ***dizque que*** están en un llano, y que a la hora que sale el sol alçavan bozes y davan grita, golpeando las rodela. Y el que tiene rodela horadada de saetas, por los agujeros de la rodela mira al sol (CORDE, *Historia general de las cosas de la Nueva España*, Fray Bernardino de Sagún, México, 1576-1577)

Thus, *dizque* began as a verbal unit ultimately developing an adverbial meaning. The diagram below shows the summary of the evolutionary process that *diz que* might have followed when it “entered” the grammaticalization channel.

Lower part



It is certain that a grammaticalization process occurred with *diz que*, but also that *diz que*, by a fusional effects, started to develop, as well, different evidential properties. Basically, this happened because the new object started to modify (and not only to introduce) the information of a given proposition. To say it differently, grammaticalization of *diz que* entailed, also, an important readjustment of its syntactical, semantic, and pragmatic configuration.

Different notions and approaches on grammaticalization have been exposed. Also, there has been explored the complexity of the process in which a verbal unit gradually became a non-verbal token. I have arrived to the conclusion that *diz que* might have entered a ‘grammaticalization channel’ that gradually converted it into *dizque*.

In the next section I would like to make an approach to the synchronic usage of *dizque*, firstly, by reviewing some of the literature regarding its variability in different American regions; secondly, by finding points in common with other particles in Spanish.



## 5. Different ways in which *dizque* is used

*Dizque* (and its variants) is widely used among the American Spanish speakers. It usually encodes the meaning of ‘supposedly’. In this section I expose some of studies regarding the uses and geographical distributions of *dizque*. I also show the similarity that *dizque* might have (both syntactically and semantically) with other particles in today’s Spanish.

### 5.1. Uses of *dizque*

In spite being many efforts in defining *dizque*, essentially, there has been very little research on its range and use. To my knowledge, one of the first and only profound studies can be found in Kany’s important work entitled *Impersonal dizque and its variants in American Spanish* published in 1944, where he analyses the uses, ranges and alternative phonological realizations of *dizque* (*quizque, quesque, izque, que...*). In the same article, he also describes the different meanings that *dizque* might have:

It will be remembered that *dizque* often corresponds to our “is supposed to”: *él dizque lo hizo* = “he is supposed to have it done”, “he supposedly did it”, etc.; its force may further developed to a doubt and even to a negation: *él dizque lo hizo* > “he is supposed to have done it” > “it is doubtful whether he did it” > “he probably did not do it.

(Kany, 1944: p. 171)

Kany directly attempts to define the form as an *epistemic modal* (i.e. it covers the scope of possibility and probability), rather than to track down that *dizque* might give the information that the speaker is doubting about the truthfulness of whatever proposition s/he is presenting. Alcázar (in press), by making an analysis of *dizque*, identifies that it has two general syntactic characteristics that defines it: either it appears as a PARTICLE or as a VERBAL MODIFIER. Whereas PARTICLE *dizque* has a relatively unrestricted sentence behavior and has several semantic and pragmatic values; VERBAL MODIFIER *dizque* creates a whole verbal unit:

(34) se atropellan unos a otros y hasta hacen periplos en el continente a lo Carlomagno o Aníbal buscando ***dizque* alianzas “estratégicas”**  
(CREA, Prensa, Honduras, 2004).

(35) LaKarina [*dizque* hizo] la vaina de la hipnosis y su supuesta vida pasada (obviamente falsa) no cuadra con su fecha de nacimiento.  
(TWITTER, Panamá, 2019).

In either case, Alcázar notes that in some dialects there are sufficient features, both, syntactically and semantically, to classify *dizque* as a ‘grammatical evidential’ rather than an ‘emergent evidential’ or a ‘lexical evidential’. He sees that *dizque* has the two main meanings related to *digamos* (‘let us suppose that’) previously announced in this work (see § 3.2): as a quotative and as a reportative.

- (36) Porque *dizque* iba a enterrar a una persona.  
‘Because *dizque* s/he was going to burry a person’

(from Travis, 2006)

Travis (2006) has also analyzed the evidential meaning and functioning of *dizque* in Colombian Spanish<sup>17</sup>. Interestingly, in his study, he notes not only that *dizque* functions as a neutral reportative (in which the speaker asserts that there is a source of evidence), but also that there are ‘other ways’ in which it is used. He amplifies the semantic scope of *dizque* by identifying four ways: reportative speech (direct and indirect), hearsay, labeling and dubitative.

In its reportative use, *dizque* occurs both, in direct and in indirect speech and its main function is to set apart the ‘marking quote’ from the surrounding discourse, encoding something like ‘someone said this’. It might also introduce gestures and thoughts.

- (37) A: Me hizo quedar mal.  
B: Cesar Gerardo?  
A: Me hizo quedar ahí, yo, *dizque*, ay...

‘A: He made me look foolish’  
B: Cesar Gerardo?  
A: He made me stay there, I, *dizque*, ay...’

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<sup>17</sup> In relation to the use of *dizque* in the non-peninsular Spanish, there can be found that it is a form widely spread. Since Kany’s work, there have been several attempts to describe its usage. Laprade (1976) analyzes the form as an expression of evidential marking in the area of La Paz, Bolivia, eventually arriving to the conclusion that evidentiality of *dizque* might be a result of contact between Spanish, a language with non-proper evidentiality system, and Andean Languages (such as Quechua and/or Aymara), where evidentiality is grammatically encoded. In spite the fact that this theory can be tenable, Travis (2006) has studied the form in a region that there has not been any contact between languages with evidential systems and languages with non-evidential systems. Miglio (2010) by using different data and comparing different corpus, detects that the usage of *dizque* started as an evidential in the XIII century. These contrastive conclusions suggest that evidentiality might not be considered as a property of interaction between languages but rather an intrinsic (and hence universal) property of languages.

- (38) Estaba ahorita = así como, hablando... solo? Hacía, *dizque* ... hacía gestos así.  
 ‘I was now = like, talking... alone? H/she, *dizque*... s/he made gestures like this’

In its hearsay appearance, *dizque* ties an utterance to an unspecific source. It can be translated to the ‘apparently’ in English, indicates that information is provided secondhand and encodes something like ‘people say that’. Grammatically speaking, it occurs with first-, second- and third-person subjects. It might also ‘suffer’ reinforcement by means of grammatical particles, such as the “quotative” *que*, as seen in example (39), or by means lexical particles, such as the verb *dice*, as seen in (40).

- (39) R: Y eso, *dizque* es peligroso no?... que atracan y todo... no?  
 D: De noche, parece que sí.  
 R: ...No, y que *dizque* hasta de día.

‘R: And that, *dizque* is dangerous, isn’t it... that they rob and everything... don’t they.  
 D: At night, it seems so.  
 R: ... No, and que *dizque* even during the day’

- (40) S: Sí, son peras.  
 A: No sé unas peras que --.. vimos allá en--.. En el Superley  
 C: Hm =  
 S: Unas peras *dizque* importadas, eso dicen.

‘S: Yes, they are pears.  
 A: I don’t know, some pears that... we saw in... in Superley  
 C: Hm =  
 S: Some pears *dizque* imported, that is what they say’

According to the author, these two types of *dizque*, hearsay and reportative, are more frequently used to introduce full clauses. Travis also identifies that *dizque* can have a labeling status. This kind of *dizque* is more infrequent and it does not introduce full clauses. Rather than this, it mainly introduces NPs or PPs. It encodes something like “Other people say this; I don’t want to say; I know this” and it is similar to the English ‘so called’. Accordingly, one use of “labeling” *dizque* is to mark a noun that the speaker finds to be unusual (41, 42).

(41) ... en medio de la confusión y de la angustia, caí en manos de una mujer médica bioenergética que a la vez era *dizque* sofróloga.

‘...in the middle of my confusion and my anxiousness, I fell in the hands of a bioenergetic medical woman that at the same time was *dizque* sophrologist’.

(42) Se presentó como, *dizque* narcotraficante.

‘S/he was presented *dizque* drugdealer’.

The last function that Travis identifies is the one that expresses meanings as extension of a doubt. Besides this, he argues that its dubitative meaning is contextually entertained and hence there is no attribution to the content of the doubt. The speaker, in all cases, expresses an attitude of non-believing:

(43) Pero fue como si nos hubieran dicho, “¡Váyanse para el D.F.!” porque nos volvemos como burros en busca de nuestra gente y *dizque* a tratar de arreglarle la situación a los trabajadores.

‘But it was like if we were told “Go to the D.F.!” because we become like donkeys that are looking their people and *dizque* to try to fix the situation to the workers’

(From Grajales, 2017; translation is mine)

In the same line, Olbertz (2007) analyzes the use of *dizque* in Mexican Spanish and arrives to the same conclusion as Travis: mainly that *dizque* does not only has a reportative or a quotative use. Even further: that the semantic impact of *dizque* depends essentially on the syntactic unit it takes within its scope. She identifies that *dizque* acts always as a modifier either at a clause and constituent level or below the constituent level:

(44) *Dizque* enero se nos fue en bombas y febrero va en caída libre.

(TWITTER, Colombia, 2019)

(45) Aquí todo niñoito maleante *dizque* traficante.

(TWITTER, Colombia, 2019)

In the first case scenario, *dizque* might modify main clauses, finite and non-finite subordinate clauses, non-verbal adverbial phrases and noun phrases. With respect to the

modification below the constituent level, Olbertz finds out that *dizque* can modify *adjectives*, *nouns* and *verbs* or other *predicative adjuncts*.

In another study regarding the analysis of the behavior of Mexican *dizque*, De la Mora y Maldonado (2015) claim that the particle has lost its evidential meaning in favor of a more epistemic use. In other words: that *dizque* is more commonly used to question the truthfulness of the information presented rather than to introduce reported speech. In the same study these authors acknowledge that this analysis is only tenable from a diachronical perspective. What is more interesting about their study, however, is that they point out that a pragmatic use emerges from an epistemic consideration of *dizque*. This is the case of the mirative use, which refers to false actions. In relation with the latter, they make a scale in order to evaluate the speakers' commitment upon the referred events, being insufficient, totally false or partially false. This meaningfulness value of *dizque* is similar to other Spanish tokens, such as *según que* and *que*.

## 5.2. Similar tokens: *según que* and *que*

In relation to its modality value, Treviño (2016) has related *dizque* to *según que*. She sees that in some cases both options have the same meaning when they appear: mainly that insertion of doubt/disbelief:

(46) *Según que* ya mero suben las fotos del pasado wknd ... vs Linces Qro en Qro.  
'As said by soon they will upload the fotos from last wknd vs Linces Qro en Qro'

(Treviño, 2016)

In example (46), the use of *dizque* could be also perfectly available (*dizque* ya mero suben las fotos...) without affecting the resultant meaning of the utterance. However, as exposed by Treviño, the distributional possibilities are restricted in each case. By considering different data, she arrives to the conclusion that *dizque* has a 'more rebellious' behavior than *según que*, as its position can be more changeable inside the sentence:

(47)

- a. **Dizque/según que** Beto había conseguido 15 boletos para el concierto de U2.
- b. **Dizque/según que** había conseguido Beto 15 boletos para el concierto de U2.

- c. Beto **dizque**/\***según que** había conseguido 15 boletos para el concierto de U2.
- d. Beto había **dizque**/\***según que**/conseguido 15 boletos para el concierto de U2.
- e. Beto había conseguido **dizque**?**según que** 15 boletos para el concierto de U2.
- f. Beto había conseguido 15 boletos **dizque**?**según que** para el concierto de U2.
- g. Beto había conseguido 15 boletos para el concierto **dizque**/\*?**según que** de U2.

‘*Dizque/según que* Beto had gotten 15 tickets for the U2 concert’

(Adapted from Treviño, 2016)

The only grammatical options that seem available for *según que* are examples (45a) and 45b), the rest of the examples present either an ungrammatical status or a not-quite-sure status. In contrast, *dizque* is perfectly available for all of the examples above.

Since *dizque* has been recognized to have a reportative consideration, Treviño (2016) has also related it with other reportative-like particles in Spanish, such as the *que*-reportative.<sup>18</sup>

(48) -**Que** ayer llovió, ¿no supiste?

REP ‘it rained yesterday, didn’t you know’

(Oral speech)

In her article, Treviño (2016) claims that reportative *que* differs from *dizque* in two ways. Firstly, because its use merely implies that the speaker acquired the information second-handed and because, as opposed to the reportative *que*, when *dizque* or analogous particles such as *según que* are used, there can be detected a modal value (distrust/disbelief/doubt) Secondly, because the source of information can be anonymous, known or identifiable. Syntactically speaking, its behavior is *dizque*-like, as it can occur as a head of a clause or not. However, its appearance is also constricted:

(49)

- a. **QUE** Beto había conseguido 15 boletos para el concierto de U2
- b. **QUE** había conseguido Beto 15 boletos para el concierto de U2.
- c. Beto había conseguido\*([,]) **QUE** 15 boletos para el concierto de U2.
- d. Beto había conseguido 15 boletos\*([,]) **QUE** para el concierto de U2.

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<sup>18</sup> This type of *que* has different properties from the *que*-comp previously characterized. As it can be seen from (48), the *que*-reportative does not introduce a subordinate clause and it is not preceded by a verbal unit.

- e. Beto había conseguido 15 boletos para el concierto\*([,]) **QUE** de U2.  
'*Que* Beto had gotten 15 tickets for the U2 concert'

(From Treviño, 2016)

More importantly, Treviño notes that for the *que* to be available when it modifies non-clausal elements, there has to be a pause. The above examples can be divided into two parts: on one hand, in (49 a, b) *que* modifies the full-clause ("Beto había conseguido 15 boletos para el concierto de U2"); on the other hand, in (49c, d, e) *que* modifies non-clausal elements, such as NPs or PPs. There can be seen that when *que* appears in the second case scenario, the whole sentence becomes ungrammatical because of the 'pause effect' marked by a comma. However, the non-clausal part is perfectly grammatical. Interestingly, when comparing examples from (47) and (49), there can be seen that all options are grammatically available as head of the clause, as exposed in (50):

- (50) **Dizque/según que/que** Beto había conseguido 15 boletos para el concierto de U2.  
'*Dizque/según que/que* Beto had gotten 15 tickets for the U2 concert'

The comparison with other similar objects becomes relevant at a certain point because it opens a window for theorizing whether the *que* ought to be consider as an apocopated form of *dizque* and *según que* or whether it has to be taken to be an independent particle.

## Conclusions and discussion

In this work I have tried to contribute to some extent to the evidential studies in Spanish, by analyzing, synchronically and diachronically, some of the instances in which *dizque* might appear. In the first place, I have shown that the term *evidentiality* might be confused with *epistemic modality*, especially in those languages that have a syntactic free form of expressing “source of information”. I have arrived to the conclusion that in some cases the distinction can be difficult to grasp because they both share an inferential property.

Followingly, I have tried to make an historical account of the evolution of *dizque* (*diz que* > *dizque*), by showing and analyzing different significative examples from ‘Old Spanish’ texts provided by the CORDE. It has been suggested that *diz que* might have been ‘dislocated’ at some point and that one of the verbal units might have had entered a grammaticalization channel, where it lost its original value of verb + compl and acquired its new value as a non-verbal object.

Lastly, I have made a review over some of the studies regarding the actual use of *dizque* in American Spanish varieties and compare the *dizque* token to other alike particles in Spanish, such as *según que* and *que*. From this comparison, some final observations were made, the main one being that *dizque* has a more ‘rebellious’ behavior (as its appearance in a sentence is almost unrestricted) than its analogous semantic sisters.

Being said this, it is certain, however, that the present study only represents a minor part of the ongoing research on evidentiality and that further investigation is required to achieve a full understanding of how linguistic change might entail, as well, changes in the grammatical configuration of language. The full understanding of the linguistic phenomena (undeniably part of the cognitive phenomena) cannot be satisfactorily achieved by only focusing on how objects of a given language interact with each other. It has also to take into consideration evolutionary aspects. The latter might be achieved by focusing on the concepts that may provide some insight tools to some of the more intricate questions regarding language change.



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